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BASE DRIFT AND THE LONGER RUN GROWTH
OF. M1: EXPERIENCE FROM A DECADE OF
MONETARY TARGETING
Alfred Broaddus and Marvin Goodfriend*
I.
INTRODUCTION: THE NATURE OF BASE DRIFT
This article discusses a technical aspect of the
Federal Reserve’s monetary targeting procedure that
has come to be known as “base drift.” The Fed has
been announcing target ranges for the growth of M1
and other monetary aggregates since 1975.
1 These
ranges have been expressed in terms of rates of
growth from a base quarter to the quarter four
quarters later.
2 The term “base drift”, refers to the
Fed’s practice of using the actual dollar level of an
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1 
M1 is the narrowly defined money supply. It currently
includes (1) currency outside the Treasury, Federal Re-
serve Banks, and the vaults of commercial banks; (2)
travelers checks of nonbank issuers; (3) demand deposits
at all commercial banks other than those due to domestic
banks, the U. S. government, and foreign banks and
official institutions less cash items in the process of
collection and Federal Reserve float; and (4) other
checkable deposits (OCD) consisting of negotiable order
of withdrawal (NOW) and automatic transfer service
(ATS) accounts at depository institutions, credit union
share draft accounts, and demand deposits at thrift insti-
tutions. The currency and demand deposit components
exclude the estimated amount of vault cash and demand
deposits respectively held. by thrift institutions to service
their OCD liabilities.
2 
The Fed began announcing target ranges following the
passage of House Concurrent Resolution 133 in March
1975. The first targets for each aggregate were expressed
in terms of growth rates from March 1975 to March 1976.
Subsequent targets were expressed as growth rates from
a particular quarter to the quarter four quarters later.
From 1975 through the end of 1978, a new four-quarter
target was established in each successive quarter Since
then, under the terms of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act
of 1978, targets have generally been set only once a
year. These targets extend from the fourth quarter of
the base year to the fourth quarter of the current year.
The one exception to this procedure since 1978 occurred
in mid-1983 when a new target was set for the second
half of the year. With this exception only the nonover-
lapping fourth quarter-to-fourth quarter targets are con-
sidered in this article.
aggregate in the base quarter as the base level for the
target range, rather than the midpoint of the targeted
range set in the preceding targeting period.
Figure 1 provides a hypothetical illustration. The
figure assumes that the 6 percent midline of the 4 to
8 percent target range set for the growth rate of M1
at the beginning, of year 1 implies an M1 level of
$500 billion in the fourth quarter of the year. The
actual growth of M1 in year 1, however, exceeds the
target range, so that the actual level in the fourth
quarter is $520 billion. In this situation, the base
level for the target range in year 2 is $520 billion, and
the amount of base drift is $20 billion.
A long-standing objective of Fed monetary policy
has been to reduce the longer run growth of M1 and
the other monetary aggregates over time to noninfla-
tionary rates in order to restore price stability.
3 To
date, however, relatively little progress has been made
toward reducing the longer run growth of M1. Most
3 
The importance of this objective has been emphasized
by all Federal Reserve Chairmen in recent years. For
example, Chairman Burns made the following statement
in testimony before the Banking and Currency Committee
of the, House of Representatives on July 30, 1974:
A return to price stability will require a national
commitment to fight inflation this year and in the
years to come. Monetary policy must play a key
role in this endeavor, and we, in the Federal Reserve,
recognize that fact. We are determined to reduce,
over time, the rate of monetary and credit expansion
to a pace consistent with price stability.
See Burns (1974), p. 258.
More recently, Chairman Volcker made the following
statement before the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs on February 25, 1981:
These technical considerations should not obscure the
basic thrust of our policy posture. Our intent is not
to accommodate inflationary forces; rather, we mean
to exert continuing, restraint on growth in money
and credit to squeeze out inflationary pressures. That
posture should be reflected in further deceleration in
the monetary aggregates in the years ahead and is
an essential ingredient in any effective policy to
restore price stability.
See Volcker (1981), p. 240.
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HYPOTHETICAL ILLUSTRATION OF BASE DRIFT
economists believe that the Fed should give greater
emphasis to M1 than the other monetary aggregates,
because M1 has had the most predictable relationship
with nominal GNP over the longer run, and it is
more amenable to Fed control than the other aggre-
gates. Perhaps for these reasons, M1 is the monetary
aggregate that receives the greatest attention from the
general public. The trend growth rate of M1 was
6.7 percent over the nine-year period from the begin-
ning of 1976, which was the first full year for which
monetary targets were announced, until the end of
the fourth quarter of 1984, compared to 5.6 percent
in the preceding ten years.
4,5 Further, there has
been little change in the trend rate within the period.
6
4 
These rates were calculated on a least squares basis.
The calculation for the 1976-1984 period was made using
the effective M1 data in Table I.
5 
Making similar comparisons for M2 and M3 would be
more problematic than in the case of M1 because of the
sharper break in the data when the definitions of the
aggregates were changed at the beginning of 1980.
In terms of the mechanics of the Fed’s targeting
procedure, one can allocate the discrepancy between
the objective and actual M1 growth to two factors
that at least in principle are separable: (1) insuffi-
cient reductions in the targeted rates of growth and
(2) net upward base drift over the period. The next
two sections of this article develop an estimate of the
contribution of base drift to the discrepancy in the
case of M1. Section II explains the construction of
an “effective” M1 time series and a corresponding
set of target ranges for effective M1 that are used in
developing the estimate, and Section III reports the
estimate. The remainder of the article is organized
as follows. Section IV explains why base drift
matters. Section V assesses the potential benefit of
base drift in the case of permanent monetary distur-
6 
The 6.7 percent trend rate includes the period of excep-
tionally rapid growth in M1 in 1982 and 1983, which in
hindsight appears to have been appropriate in that as of
early 1985, inflation has remained low. See the discussion
in Sections V and VII of this article.
4 ECONOMIC REVIEW, NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1984bances. An alternative targeting procedure that would
eliminate base drift is outlined in Section VI. The
effective M1 data constructed in Section II provide
evidence on the role of monetary targeting in the
recent reduction of inflation. This evidence is dis-
cussed in a postscript in Section VII. Section VIII




CONSTRUCTING A TIME SERIES FOR
EFFECTIVE M1 AND CORRESPONDING
TARGET RANGES FOR EFFECTIVE M1
In order to measure base drift accurately over time,
it is necessary to construct data series for both M1
itself and the M1 target ranges that are conceptually
consistent both over time and with one another.
Doing so is complicated by two events that occurred
during the period. First, M1 was redefined at the
beginning of 1980. Second, as explained below, the
reported growth of M1 was distorted by the legaliza-
tion and rapid growth of negotiable order, of with-
drawal (NOW) accounts and other interest-bearing
transactions accounts in several years during the
period. This section describes. how each of these
problems is handled. The mechanics involved are
somewhat tedious but are essential to a full under-
standing of the results presented below.
Tables I and II contain the constructed data. Table
I shows “effective” M1, i.e., M1 adjusted for the
shifting of funds between various categories of de-
posit accounts occasioned by deregulation. These
adjustments were made on an ex post basis using the
latest estimates of the actual shifting that occurred.
The details of the adjustments are described below.
Table II shows the target ranges for the growth of
effective M1. In the majority of the years covered,
these ranges are the same as the ranges announced by
the Fed. In one year where the growth rate of effec-
tive M1 diverged from the growth rate of reported
M1 due to deregulation, however, it is necessary to
infer the target for the growth of effective M1 from
the publicly announced targets for the growth of
reported M1. The guiding principle is to develop a
series for the target ranges that indicates the growth
rate of effective M1 that the Fed sought for each
year, whether the rate was expressed or implied. The
nature of each adjustment is described below.
8
Change in the Definition of M1
M1 as it was defined before 1980, which is referred
to as “old M1” in this article, included mainly ‘cur-
rency in the hands of the public and demand deposits
at commercial banks. In 1980, a “new M1” series was
defined that includes the major components of old
M1 and, in addition, what are now designated “other
checkable deposits” (OCD). OCDs include NOW
accounts and automatic transfer service (ATS) ac-
counts at commercial banks and thrift institutions,
credit union share draft accounts, and demand de-
posits at mutual savings banks.
9
Prior to 1980 the Fed established M1 targets in
terms of old M1. Since 1980, the M1 targets have
been set in terms of new M1. In measuring base drift
it is necessary to calculate the deviation of the par-
ticular measure of M1 that was actually targeted in a
given year from the midpoint of the target range for
that year. Therefore, the most straightforward way
to proceed is to calculate money growth and base
drift prior to 1980 using old M1 and subsequently to
make the calculation in terms of new M1. This is
what was done. Fortunately, the difference between
the respective dollar levels using the two definitions
is small in the quarter when the definition was
changed.
10 Specifically, new M1 exceeded old M1
8 
It is important to note that while the adjustments made
in constructing the effective M1 series (Table I) were
made on an ex post basis, the adjustments to the target,
ranges (Table II) were made on an ex ante basis. That
is, estimates of the actual shifting of funds caused by
deregulation were used in constructing the effective M1
series. In contrast, the adjustments to the target ranges.
where they occur, reflect the deposit shifts that the Fed
anticipated would occur during a year as seen at the
beginning of the year.
9 
See footnote 1 in this article for the precise current
definition of M1, which, in addition to the changes made
in 1980, incorporates some additional minor changes made
in 1981. It should be noted that the Fed published data
for two M1 series, known as M-1A and M-1B, in 1980
and 1981. The M-1A measure, which was close to the
pre-1980 M1, was dropped at the beginning of 1982, and
M-1B was designated as. M1. All references in this
article to M1 in 1980 and 1981 are to what was then
designated M-1B.
10 
This small difference in dollar levels results from the
netting out of two discrepancies. As noted above, M1 as
currently defined includes OCDs, while old M1 excludes
them, which tends to raise the level of M1 as currently
defined relative to the level under the old definition. In
addition however, old M1 included demand deposits of
foreign commercial banks and foreign official institutions,
which are excluded under the current definition. This
second discrepancy raises the level of old M1 relative to
the level under the current definition.
7 
It should be noted that the potential problems with base
drift were recognized by several economists shortly after
the Fed began announcing targets. See, in particular,
Poole (1976) and Kane (1975).





























































Notes for Table I
1. Data for 4Q75 through 4Q79 are based on the old definition
of M1 to maintain comparability with the target ranges. These
data were derived from the final data released by the Board
of Governors using the old definition. (The data through 1978
are contained in “Historical Money Stock Revisions,” February
1979. The data for 1979 are contained in the Board’s H.6
release dated January 10, 1980.) Subsequent data are based
on the new definition, which was referred to as M-1B in 1980
and 1981. These data were derived from published data as of
January 1985. For 4Q79, the first figure is for the old
definition and the second figure is for the new definition.
The difference between the two figures is $0.9 billion.
1979. In late 1978 all commercial banks were
permitted to offer ATS accounts, which are interest-
bearing transactions accounts functionally equivalent
to NOW accounts. Funds switched from demand
deposits to ATS accounts presumably retained the
characteristics of transactions accounts. Therefore,
shifts from demand deposits, which were in old M1,
to ATS accounts, which were not, caused the re-
ported growth of old M1 to understate the effective
growth of M1 in 1979. Consequently, an estimate
of the volume of funds shifted from demand deposits
to ATS accounts was added to old M1 in 1979 in
constructing the effective M1 series in Table I. This
adjustment raised the M1 growth rate in 1979 by
1¼ percentage points.
2. Data for 1Q79-4Q79 are adjusted to correct for the shift of
funds from demand deposits to ATS accounts following the
authorization of ATS accounts in late 1978. ATS accounts
were not included in M1 under the old definition, and the
adjustment in 1979 added these funds back into M1. This
adjustment raised the growth rate of M1 from 4Q78 to 4Q79
by 1.25 percentage points. This adjustment and all adjustments
in subsequent notes to this table are based on estimates
published by the Board of Governors.
At the beginning of 1979, the Fed announced a
target range for reported M1 of 1½ to 4½ percent.
11 
All of the adjustments described in this article are
based on estimates published by the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System.
4. Data for 1981 are adjusted to correct for the shift of funds
from assets not included in the new definition of M1 into NOW
accounts as a result of the legalization of NOW accounts
nationwide. This adjustment reduced the growth rate of M1
from 4QB0 to 4QB1 by 2.7 percentage points.
3. Data for the second half of 1980 are adjusted to correct for 5. Shifts of funds associated with the legalization of NOW
shifts of funds from assets not included in the new definition accounts nationwide are believed to have been substantially
of M1 into ATS accounts in anticipation of the legalization of completed by the end of 1981. In order to maintain a con-
NOW accounts nationwide scheduled for December 31, 1980.
This adjustment reduced the growth rate of M1 from 4Q79 to
tinuous series, however, the cumulative downward adjustment
of $13.4 billion applied to the 4QB1 figure was applied to all
4QB0 by 0.5 percentage point. subsequent figures.
by less than $2 billion or by roughly 0.5 percent on
an effective basis as described directly below in the
fourth quarter of 1979, just prior to the change in
definition. For this reason, simply switching from
the old M1 measure to the new measure in the first
quarter of 1980 introduces only a small error in the
cumulative base drift calculation.
Adjustments for Shifts into and out of NOW
Accounts and Similar Accounts Due to
Deregulation
11
As pointed out above, the reported growth of M1
was distorted by the ongoing deregulation of trans-
actions accounts on several occasions during the
period covered by this analysis. Both the distortions
themselves and the manner in which the Fed dealt
with them differed from one year to the next. The
following paragraphs describe the situation on each
occasion and indicate the nature of the adjustments
made in each case in constructing the data in Tables
I and II.
6 ECONOMIC REVIEW, NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1984At the time, the Fed estimated that shifts of funds
from demand deposits to ATS accounts would re-
duce old M1 growth by 3 percentage points over the
year. The 1½ to 4½ percent target range explicitly
allowed for this anticipated reduction in the reported
growth rate.
12 The implication is that the Fed was
willing to accept effective M1 growth in a range of
4½ to 7½ percent as shown in Table II.
1980. The Monetary Control Act of 1980, which
was signed into law in March of that year, authorized
NOW accounts nationwide effective December 31,
1980. Consequently, many banks in states where
NOW accounts were not yet permitted marketed
ATS accounts aggressively in the second half of 1980
to position themselves competitively for the antici-
pated legalization of NOWs the following year. In
1980, however, in contrast to 1979, the Fed set
targets in terms of new M1, which included ATS
accounts. For this reason, a different kind of adjust-
ment for shifts into ATS accounts, was needed in
constructing the effective M1 series for 1980, Spe-
cifically, since ATS accounts are included in new M1,
the shifting of funds from demand deposits to ATS
accounts did not affect new M1 and therefore re-
quired no adjustment. Some funds, however, were
shifted into ATS accounts from savings accounts and
other instruments not included in new M1. These
shifts increased reported new M1. It was assumed
that these latter funds largely retained their nontrans-
actions character after they were shifted into ATS
accounts and hence into new M1. This implies that
reported new M1 growth overstated the effective
growth of transactions balances in 1980. Therefore,
an estimate of the portion of the growth of ATS and
similar accounts due to transfers of funds from sav-
ings and other non-M1 instruments was subtracted
from reported new M1 in the second half of 1980 in
constructing effective M1 in Table I. This adjust-
ment reduced the growth rate one-half of a percentage
point in 1980.
In announcing its targets for 1980, the Fed recog-
nized, that if NOW accounts were legalized during
12 
See “Monetary Policy Report to Congress” (March
1979), p. 196. It should be noted that the target range
for reported growth was raised from 1½ - 4½ to 3 - 6
percent in the middle of 1979. (See “Monetary Policy
Report to Congress” (March 1980), p. 187.) This increase
reflected new estimates which indicated that the growth
of ATS accounts would reduce the reported growth rate
by only 1½ percentage points, over the year rather than
by the 3 percentage points estimated at the beginning of
the year. However, the implied target for effective growth
was not changed, i.e., both the estimated impact of the
shifting of funds and the target range for reported growth
were revised by the same amount.
Table II
EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED ANNUAL TARGET RANGES
FOR EFFECTIVE M1 AND CORRESPONDING
ACTUAL EFFECTIVE M1 GROWTH, 1975-1985
1. The ranges in this table are the same as, or were derived from,
the target ranges that were announced by the Federal Reserve
at the beginning of the year to which the target applied. For
1979 and subsequent target years announcements have been
contained in the Federal Reserve’s annual Monetary Policy
Report to Congress, which is usually published in the March
issue of the Federal Reserve Bulletin. For 1976, 1977, and
1978, the announcements are contained in Burns (1976), Burns
(1977), and Miller (1978), respectively.
2. The target ranges for 1979 and 1981 are adjusted for antici-
pated shifts into or out of NOW accounts or similar, accounts
as explained in the text. The ranges for the periods 4Q79-
4Q80 and 4Q80-4Q81 are the ranges that were set for what
war then referred to as M-18.
P preliminary
the year, the legalization would cause shifts of funds.
Because it was not clear at the beginning of the year
if legalization would occur or when, no allowance
was made for it in setting the range. Therefore, the
4 to 6½ percent announced range was the target
range for effective M1 growth.
13
1981. NOW accounts were authorized nationwide
at the beginning of 1981, and this change produced
substantial shifts of funds from non-M1 instruments,.
such as savings deposits, to NOW accounts during
the year. Presuming again that these funds retained
13 
See “Monetary Policy Report to Congress” (March
1980), p. 178.
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reported growth of M1 overstated effective growth.
At the beginning of the year, the Fed estimated that
the shifting of funds would reduce effective M1
growth relative to reported growth by 2.5 percentage
points. The 3½ to 6 percent range announced at the
beginning of 1981 and shown in Table II reflects
these anticipated shifts.
14
The effective M1 data for 1981 in Table I reflect
the most recent estimate of the actual NOW ac-
count effect, which indicates that in fact the shifts
reduced the growth rate for the year by 2.7 per-
centage points. It should be noted that the effective
M1 levels reported in Table I for 1981 incorporate
both the 1981 adjustments and the adjustment for the
final quarter of 1980, since any adjustment must be
carried permanently in a continuously adjusted series
such as this one. The two adjustments together put
effective M1 $13.4 billion below reported M1 in the
fourth quarter of 1981.
1982, 1983 and 1984. In order to maintain a con-
sistent series, all of the data in Table I for 1982, 1983
and 1984 incorporate the $13.4 billion adjustment
made in the final quarter of 1981. No further adjust-
ments, however, are made in these years. This
absence of further adjustments may seem curious in
view of the authorization of money market deposit
accounts (MMDAs) in late 1982 and Super NOW
accounts in early 1983. Since the MMDA accounts
were not included in M1, any transfers of funds from
accounts included in M1 to the MMDAs would cause
the reported M1 data to understate effective growth
of M1 if it is assumed that the funds retained
their transactions character after the shift. On the
other hand, since the Super NOW accounts were
included in M1, any transfers of funds from non-
transactions accounts not included in M1 to the
Super NOWs would cause the reported M1 data to
overstate the effective growth of M1 to the extent
that the funds retained their nontransactions char-
acter after the shift. As it turned out, the Fed’s esti-
mates of these two shifts are roughly equal and
therefore offsetting.
15 For this reason, no further
adjustments are made.
14 
In 1981, in contrast to other years in which such
shifting occurred, the Fed released and focused on “shift-
adjusted” (i.e., what this article has called “effective”)
M1 data, and it also announced its target range in terms
of effective growth.
15 
See “Monetary Policy Report to the Congress” (Feb-
ruary 1984), p. 80.
III.
THE ESTIMATE OF CUMULATIVE BASE DRIFT
With the “effective” M1 data and the correspond-
ing target ranges in hand, the computation of cumu-
lative base drift is straightforward. The heavy solid
line in Figure 2 plots the effective M1 series from
Table I. The target ranges attached to this line are
the adjusted fourth quarter-to-fourth quarter target
ranges for effective M1 given in Table II. (To avoid
cluttering the chart, the numerical ranges are shown
along the horizontal axis.) As the chart shows, M1
finished the year near the midpoint of its range on
two occasions : in 1976 and in the second half of 1983.
It ended 1981 slightly below the lower bound of the
range, and it ended 1984 in the lower half of the
range. In every other year, it ended the year either
in the upper third of the range (1979) or above it
(1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, and the first half of 1983).
This tendency to exceed the range more frequently
than not has led to substantial net upward base drift
over the period as a whole. One way to estimate the
cumulative drift is to compare the actual level of
M1 at a point near the end of the period with the
level that M1 would have attained if the Fed had
(1) hit the midpoint of its target range at the end of
every year and (2) set the same ranges for growth
rates that it actually set. The midlines of the target
ranges drawn with dashed lines in Figure 2 indicate
the path M1 would have followed if the midpoints
had been hit. On this path, effective M1 would have
been $477.2 billion in the fourth quarter of 1954,
compared with the actual level of $534.5 billion net of
the definitional discrepancy in 1980. The $57.3 billion
difference between these levels is a measure of the
net upward base drift that occurred under the Fed’s
targeting procedure from the fourth quarter of 1975
through the end of 1984. In other words, about 25
percent of the increase in effective M1 during this
nine-year period can be attributed to base drift.
16
The estimate given above is a rough approximation
of cumulative base drift because the Fed might have
set somewhat different targets from those actually set
if it had hit the midpoint of the range each year. For
this reason, the estimate is unavoidably hypothetical.
16 
It should be noted that while base drift is measured
here as any deviation from the midpoint of the target
range, the Fed itself has avoided setting the midpoint of
its range as a point target. In some years, it has explicitly
indicated that growth at a rate different from the rate
implied by the midpoint would be acceptable. Neverthe-
less, since the base for each target range is a point, it
seems reasonable to quantify base drift in terms of devi-
ations from the midpoints of the ranges.
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ACTUAL LEVELS AND TARGET RANGES FOR EFFECTIVE M1
1/
In particular, if changes in the midline target growth
rates were negatively correlated with the base drift
at the end of the preceding target year, the estimate
would be biased upward. This is the case because
with negative correlation, if there had been no base
drift as in the hypothetical, situation shown by the
dashed lines in Figure 2, the growth targets would
have been higher on average than those that were
actually set. Figure 3 shows the observed relationship
between actual base drift and subsequent change in
the target. There is no evidence of negative corre-
lation. Indeed, Figure 3 suggests a positive corre-
lation, which would imply that the above estimate is
biased downward. 
IV.
WHY BASE DRIFT MATTERS
The preceding section showed that cumulative base
drift has been quantitatively significant during the
years that the Fed has used the present targeting
procedure. Moreover, because there has been both
upward and downward base drift over the period, the
cumulative measure understates the quantitative sig-
nificance of base drift on a year-to-year basis.
17 Be-
yond its quantitative impact, however, allowing base
drift would seem to rob the Fed’s targeting strategy
of some of its most important benefits.
Erosion of Public Confidence in the
Effectiveness of the Targeting Procedure
The effectiveness of monetary targeting in con-
trolling inflation depends largely on the public’s
confidence in the Fed’s commitment to long-run
control of the money stock. More specifically, the
public must believe that the Fed will hit its announced
targets on average over time. The contribution of
the present targeting procedure to this confidence is
almost certainly diminished by the frequent discrep-
ancies between the targets and actual money growth
in particular years and the incorporation of each miss
in the base set for the next annual target.
17 
Annual base drift measured as a percentage of midline
target levels at the end of each target year can be seen in
Figure 3.
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
BASE DRIFT AND SUBSEQUENT
CHANGE IN MIDLINE TARGET GROWTH
Diminished Incentive for the Fed
to Hit Its Target
A closely related point is that the allowance of base
drift reduces the incentive for the Fed to hit its target
in any particular year. At least as far as the pro-
cedure is concerned, any target miss that occurs in a
given year is forgiven when the target for the next
year is set, and the miss is therefore only temporarily
in the public eye.
18 The Fed’s incentive to correct a
deviation from the target that arises during a year is
therefore reduced because no matter how large the
18 
In principle, base drift could be offset by moving subse-
quent targeted growth in the opposite direction. However,
as seen in Figure 3, in practice change in targeted growth
seems to be positively correlated with prior base drift.
In any case, it would not seem desirable to use a tar-
geting procedure where announced growth rates are
routinely adjusted in response to prior money supply
disturbances. The alternative procedure outlined in Sec-
tion VI would not require such routine adjustment.
deviation might be at the end of the year, the money
stock is back on target when the new range is set.
This feature of the present targeting procedure sub-
stantially reduces the disciplinary benefits of mone-
tary targeting.
Propagation of Transitory Disturbances
The secular inflation rate tends to follow the trend
rate of M1 growth over time. With unbiased mone-
tary targeting, where target misses are truly random,
the Fed could control inflation on average with the
current targeting procedure as long as persistently
noninflationary target paths were set. Even in these
circumstances, however, allowing base drift would
be an inferior targeting strategy.
Figure 4, which is similar to Figure 1, illustrates
this point with another hypothetical example. In the
first of the two years shown, actual M1 grows at a
rate close to the midline of the target range through
the first three quarters of the year. It then declines
in the final quarter of the year to point B, which is
only slightly above the 4 percent lower bound of the
range. The growth rate targeted in the second year
is shown to be the same as in the first year. Because
of the downward base drift, however, the level of the
target path given by the midline of the range has
declined by the difference between points C and B.
That is, the target path in the second year is $9 billion
below what it would have been if the base had not
been allowed to drift. This hypothetical example has
its counterparts in actual experience. As shown in
Figure 2, above-target growth in 1978 significantly
raised the level of the target path for 1979, and below-
target growth in 1981 lowered the path for 1982.
To the extent that short-run target misses are due
to transitory shifts in credit or money demand,
19 base
drift needlessly allows temporary disturbances to
affect the money stock and the price level perma-
nently. Consequently, uncertainty about the future
price level tends to be greater with base drift than
without it. The contribution that monetary targeting
makes to economic efficiency by reducing uncertainty
surrounding the future price level is therefore smaller
when base drift is built into the targeting procedure.
20
In short, because M1 growth is prone to significant
quarterly disturbances that would otherwise be transi-
tory, it would not appear to be desirable for the Fed’s
targeting procedure to build these disturbances into




For more discussion of this point see Goodfriend
(1984).
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EFFECT OF A SHORT-RUN DISTURBANCE ON THE LONGER RUN TARGET
V. On the basis of this episode, it might be argued that
BASE DRIFT AND “PERMANENT”
MONETARY DISTURBANCES
Figure 2 shows that a sizable portion of the cumu-
lative upward base drift to date arose at the end of
the 1982 targeting year and during the 1983 targeting
year. As is well known, the velocity of M1 declined
unusually sharply in the late stages of the recession
that ended in the fourth quarter of 1982 and expanded
unusually slowly during the first year of the recovery.
In this situation, the Fed deliberately allowed M1
growth to exceed its target range substantially in the
second half of 1982 in order to prevent the economy
from weakening further.
21 Since it thought that the
decline in velocity might be permanent, the Fed ap-
parently felt comfortable basing its 1983 range at the
high actual level of M1 in the fourth quarter of
1982.
22
base drift is a desirable feature of the Fed’s targeting
strategy, since it allows the Fed to accommodate
permanent disturbances in the relationship between
income and the public’s demand for money. Even if
it were. possible to identify such permanent distur-
bances at the time they occur, however, it does not
follow that allowing base drift as a routine feature of
the targeting procedure would be either necessary or
desirable. Faced with such a disturbance, it might be
necessary for the Fed to raise its targeted growth rate
temporarily or to raise, the level of the target path.
Discretionary adjustments of the targets in reaction
to conclusive evidence of permanent monetary distur-
bances, however, would be very different from rou-
22 
Similar reasoning led the Fed to set a new base for
the period between the second quarter of 1983 and the
fourth quarter of 1983 after M1 growth had exceeded its
original 1983 range during the first half of the year. It
should be noted that the Fed de-emphasized M1 between
October 1982 and July 1984. The 1983 M1 range was
referred to officially as a “monitoring” range.
21 
See “Monetary Policy Report to Congress” (March
1983), p. 134.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMONDtinely permitting any base drift to affect the target
path.
VI.
AN ALTERNATIVE TARGETING STRATEGY
Two relatively simple changes in the Fed’s target-
ing procedure would eliminate base drift and the
problems associated with it.
23 First, whatever money
growth rate the Fed chooses to target in a given
year, the base level for the target path should be
the midpoint of the target range for the preceding
year. In terms of Figure 1, the base level for the
midline of the second year range should be the end
point of the first year midline, or $500 billion. This
change would be sufficient to eliminate base drift.
24
A second helpful modification, although strictly
speaking not needed to eliminate base drift, would be
to set the upper and lower bounds of the target range
in terms of a band rather than the present wedge.
The band would give the Fed the same room to
maneuver throughout the targeting year. In par-
ticular, the Fed would have more room to maneuver
early in a targeting year, when it might be desirable
to deal gradually with money supply disturbances
inherited from the previous targeting year.
Figure 5 shows how this procedure would work
using the hypothetical data from Figure 4. As drawn,
the chart indicates that the 6 percent target for money
growth in the first year is retained in the second
year. If the targeted growth rate were. lowered to,
say, 5 percent in year 2, the slope of the path would
be lowered in the second year, but the base would
still be the $500 billion level given by the midline of
the year 1 target range in the fourth quarter of the
first year. The width of the band could be 2 or 3
percentage points of the targeted level. Obviously, a
narrower band would encourage greater monetary
control in the short run and vice versa.
In the example in Figure 5, actual M1 ends year 1
near the lower bound of the target band. The ex-
ample can be used to illustrate the advantages of both
of the modifications suggested above. Regarding the
first modification, since point A would be the year 2
target, the modified procedure would require the Fed
to aim to offset the first year shortfall in year 2 rather
than forgiving the miss as under the present pro-
23 
These modifications were originally suggested by Poole
(1976), pp. 255-57.
24 
If there were conclusive evidence of a permanent mone-
tary disturbance, the base could be adjusted to take ac-
count of it, but such adjustments would only be made
under exceptional circumstances.
cedure. The Fed would also have a stronger incen-
tive to prevent a target miss from occurring in year 1.
This additional discipline would almost certainly in-
crease the public’s confidence in the Fed’s ability to
achieve its longer run objective of fostering steady,
noninflationary growth in the money supply.
Regarding the second modification, it would be
much easier for the Fed to use the year 1 target as
the base for year 2 with a target band than with a
wedge. As should be evident from Figure 5, if the
Fed were to eliminate base drift but retain the wedge-
shaped range from the old procedure, the money
supply would be more likely to begin each new tar-
geting year outside the range. This situation would
be difficult for the Fed and confusing to the public.
Using a band would allow the Fed to move the
money supply gradually back to the target midline
while remaining inside the target range.
VII.
A POSTSCRIPT ON THE ROLE OF
MONETARY TARGETING IN THE
RECENT REDUCTION IN INFLATION
The United States has experienced a sharp reduc-
tion in inflation since 1980. For example, annual
inflation as measured by the GNP deflator declined
from 10.2 percent in 1980 to 4.3 percent in 1982 and
has remained below 4 percent since then. The Fed
must be given credit for pursuing the restrictive
monetary policy that made this reduction in inflation
possible. What role did monetary targeting per se
play in achieving the reduction.? The effective M1
data in Table I provide some evidence on this
question.
Inflation actually increased sharply during the first
five years of monetary targeting. Annual inflation
as measured by the GNP deflator rose from 4.7
percent in 1976 to 8.2 percent in 1979 and 10.2
percent in 1980. As shown in Table II, effective M1
overshot the upper bound of the Fed’s target ranges
in 1977 and 1978, and it came in within the upper
third of the implied range in 1979. This perfor-
mance created doubts about the Fed’s commitment to
its money supply targets and tended to encourage
the increase in inflation in the late 1970s.
After renewing its commitment to disinflationary
policy in October 1979, the Fed again let effective
M1 overshoot its target in 1980, and the inflation
rate remained high throughout that year. Then, in
sharp contrast to the preceding four years, effective
M1 actually undershot its range in 1981. As the data
in Table I show, effective M1 grew 4.6 percentage
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points slower in 1981 than its average annual growth tary targeting per se does not appear to have con-
tributed significantly to the reduction in inflation.
Instead, it appears that the reduction was due to the
shock of an unanticipated undershooting, of the M1
target range following a four-year period during
which growth either exceeded the range or came in
well in the upper portion of the range.
over the preceding five years.
25 Further, the 2 percent
downward base drift in 1981 (see Figure 3) was
built into the 1982 target path. This slower M1
growth was not the gradual deceleration built into
the Fed’s announced targets. Rather, it was a sharp
deceleration that brought about an ‘unexpectedly rapid
decline in inflation-and may have worsened the 1981-
1982 recession.
26 In short, the discipline of mone-
25 
The effective M1 data in Table I may understate the
deceleration somewhat, since, as noted in Section II, the
data in the Table I series for the years prior to 1980 are
based on the old definition, which excluded OCDs. Since
OCDs began to grow significantly more rapidly in the
late 1970s, an effective M1 series that uses the current
definition throughout shows more rapid growth in the
five years preceding 1981 and hence a sharper decelera-
tion in 1981. Specifically, average annual effective growth
in the five years preceding 1981 under the current defini-
tion is 7.4 percent, and the 1981 deceleration is therefore
5.0 percentage points.
26 
It should be noted that during the course of 1981, the
Fed felt that the weakness in M1 growth might be due in
part to a lasting decrease in velocity resulting from im-
provement in cash management practices. Its limited
reaction to the weakness in M1 was also affected by rela-
tively strong growth in M2 and M3. See “Monetary
Policy Report to the Congress” (March 1982), p. 129.
By the summer of 1982, the unusual decline in M1
velocity together with the recession and developing
strains in financial markets led the Fed to de-
emphasize its M1 target. M1 grew over the next
four quarters at a very high 12.3 percent rate. In
retrospect, the 1982 decision to accommodate the
increased demand for M1 appears to have been
appropriate in the sense that inflation has remained
low.
An argument can be made, however, that the un-
usual decline in velocity in 1982 and some of the
strain in financial markets that accompanied it have
been due to the substantial deceleration in the
growth of effective M1 in 1981 and the sharp reduc-
tion in actual inflation that followed. It was reason-
able to expect that velocity would decline as falling
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND 13inflation reduced nominal interest rates and lowered
the cost of holding money. But it was extremely
difficult to predict either how much or how quickly
the public would revise its inflationary anticipations
downward in the face of the pronounced monetary
shock ; hence, it was particularly difficult to forecast
the size and timing of the decline in velocity. As
mentioned above, in retrospect rapid money growth
in 1982-1983 has proven to be appropriate. Never-
theless, making monetary policy choices during a
rapid disinflation is particularly difficult. If M1 had
followed the gradual announced deceleration built
into the targets, inflation would more likely have
come down gradually, the recession and financial
strains might have been less severe, and velocity
might have fallen more gradually and predictably.
VIII.
SUMMARY
This article has described the nature of base drift.
estimated its cumulative impact on the effective
growth of M1 since 1975, and indicated several ways
in which it undermines the Fed’s present monetary
targeting strategy. As noted in Section III, net base
drift was substantially upward over the 1975-1984
period, although in retrospect some part of the drift
that occurred in 1982 and 1983 may have been for-
tuitous in the sense that inflation has remained low
through 1984. In any event, since there has been
both upward and downward base drift during the
period, the cumulative drift tends to understate the
quantitative significance of base drift on a year-to-
year basis. As pointed out in Section IV, the allow-
ance of base drift greatly reduces the disciplinary
features of monetary targeting and therefore probably
reduces its effectiveness and credibility. The modifi-
cations of the present procedure noted in Section VI
would eliminate base drift, give the Fed an incentive
to control the growth of the money supply more
closely in the short run, and in all likelihood increase
the public’s confidence in the Fed’s commitment to
restore and maintain price stability.
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